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INTRODUCTION
Living in California, it is impossible
to ignore the massive advertising cam-
paign sponsored by the California State
Lottery. During the past five years, radio
spots, billboards, magazine advertise-
ments, newspapers, posters, television
commercials, and even television shows
have constantly reminded Californians
that "millions of dollars" are theirs for
the taking-and "our schools win, too!"
How much of this expensive advertis-
ing is necessary? How much of it is on
the level? Is the state telling us every-
thing we have a right to know? Does the
State Lottery engage in advertising and
marketing techniques which are not tol-
erated when engaged in by private enter-
prise? What laws exist to protect the
public from misleading or false claims
made by the State of California in pro-
moting its Lottery?
Unfortunately, the answers to some of
these questions are not satisfactory.
Many private businesses routinely walk
that fine line between advertising claims
which are legally acceptable and claims
which are fraudulent and/or misleading.
The actions of the State of California
should not approach that line. But the
California State Lottery promotes gam-
bling by engaging in advertising cam-
paigns which misstate the value of the
prizes, distort the odds of winning,
overemphasize the significance of Lot-
tery proceeds on the state's education
budget, and encourage those who can
least afford it to waste unlimited funds
on an ephemeral fantasy.
LOTTERIES TODAY
In General. At present, 33 states
operate lotteries. Eleven of these lotter-
ies have been launched since 1981.
Although a number of subsidiary forces
may have lurked behind the legalization
of each lottery, it is fairly safe to say that
one reason overshadows all others: lot-
tery revenues are perceived by most vot-
ers (and legislators) as an alternative to
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tax increases. During the 1970s and
1980s, legislators across the country
were quick to recognize that when faced
with either a tax hike or the legalization
of a lottery, their constituency was more
receptive to the lottery.'
Moreover, in approximately half the
states operating lotteries today, the rev-
enue is statutorily dedicated to a specific
program-often one considered to be
fundamentally important to the well-
being of the state and politically palat-
able to the electorate. These programs
include worthy causes such as education,
senior citizens' programs, transportation,
parks and recreation, and job develop-
ment.' If there is no such specific man-
date, the revenues are usually deposited
in the state's general fund for disburse-
ment.
Creation of the California State Lot-
tery. During the early 1970s, the Califor-
nia Senate Committee on Governmental
Organization was presented with no few-
er than twelve separate measures which
would have authorized the establishment
of a state lottery.3 This fact prompted the
Committee to direct its staff to conduct a
study regarding the effects of a state-run
lottery in California. This study, released
in 1975, acknowledged that gaming rev-
enue may be "regressive, inequitable,
costly, variable and unpredictable."' Fur-
ther, the report noted that in order for a
lottery to be successful, the state would
have to promote gambling as a business,5
presumably through intensive marketing
strategies.
The Committee report discussed
some of the arguments against legalized
gambling. Initially, gambling is general-
ly viewed as a vice; it compels people to
act irrationally in the vain hope of get-
ting something for nothing.' Also, many
fear that gambling corrupts government.
The Reverend Dean M. Kelley, Director
of Governmental Relations for the
National Council of Churches in New
York, has stated, "They say that by legal-
izing gambling you take it out of the
hands of criminals, but it's my impres-
sion that rather than making gambling
honest, it makes government corrupt."
Another fear is that the sponsorship of
gambling is a peculiarly inappropriate
activity for government participation.'
Finally, the establishment and promotion
of legalized gambling could depress
business markets by diverting money
away from consumer purchases.9
These concerns reveal just a few of
the reasons the state legislature consis-
tently rejected attempts to establish a lot-
tery. However, in 1984, the matter was
taken out of the legislature's hands and
put into the hands of the California elec-
torate in the form of Proposition 37, the
California Lottery Act. Proposition 37
was a constitutional and statutory initia-
tive which authorized the creation of the
California State Lottery and the Califor-
nia State Lottery Commission, a five-
member board authorized to implement
and manage the Lottery.'0 The initiative
specifically directs that 50% of Lottery
revenues be paid as prizes, no less than
34% be allocated to public education,
and no more than 16% be used for over-
head expenses.". The initiative was draft-
ed and promoted by a group called "Cal-
ifornians for Better Education."
However, the primary sponsor of and
contributor to this group was Scientific
Games, one of the largest vendors in the
lottery industry and a subsequent recipi-
ent of major California State Lottery
contracts.
Proposition 37 was heavily promoted
to the California voters. One estimate of
the amount spent by Scientific Games
alone put the total figure at over $2 mil-
lion.'2 And the promoters of the initiative
were rewarded: Proposition 37 was
approved by the California voters. Thus
the California State Lottery (CSL) was
created-and it quickly become the
largest state-run lottery in the country.'3
Further, its annual administrative budget
is larger than those of California's most
important regulatory agencies combined.
In 1989, the Commission on California
State Government Organization and
Economy (also known as the "Little
Hoover Commission") reported that the
estimated amount of money spent by
CSL that year on its own administration
(excluding the amounts directed to pub-
lic education and prize money) exceeded
the combined budgets of the Air
Resources Board, the California Waste
Management Board, the Coastal Com-
mission, the Fish and Game Commis-
sion, the Board of Forestry, the Water
Resources Control Board. the Public
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Utilities Commission, the California
Energy Commission, the Agricultural
Labor Relations Board, the Fair Political
Practices Commission, the Fair Employ-
ment and Housing Commission, and the
Commission on Teacher Credentialing.'4
LOTTERY ADVERTISING
Is It Necessary? Once a state deter-
mines that it is going to operate a lottery,
the question remains whether active
marketing, promoting, and advertising
of its lottery is warranted. Lottery offi-
cials across the country-as well as
advertising executives-defend their
massive advertising budgets by asserting
that the more the public is made aware
of the lottery, the more it will play the
lottery. And more people playing the lot-
tery means more money becomes avail-
able for state spending. In California,
supporters hasten to add that the ultimate
beneficiaries of the advertising cam-
paigns are children, through the Lot-
tery's contribution to the state education
budget.
However, some commentators liken
the authorization of a lottery to state
legalization and regulati on of horse rac-
ing or dog racing. These commentators
assert that legalization and subsequent
regulation is one thing, but active partic-
ipation and promotion is another. The
state of California, for example, regu-
lates the horse racing industry and
receives a percentage of all racetrack
handles,6 which it deposits into its gen-
eral fund. Likewise, California presently
imposes special taxes on cigarettes and
alcohol. Revenues received from both
taxes are used for needed programs. Yet
the state does not actively encourage
Californians to bet on horse races or
consume liquor or tobacco products,
even though it could increase available
funds for worthy programs if such
advertising were undertaken.
However, Lottery officials prefer to
create a distinction between participa-
tion in a state-run lottery and engaging
in other gambling forums or alcohol and
tobacco consumption. Chon Gutierrez,
Executive Director of the California
State Lottery, contends, "The lottery is
not gambling. It's entertainment.""
Echoing this argument is Susan Clark,
former marketing director of CSL, who
has stated, "I don't consider the lottery
gambling....It's a game. People play it to
have fun and help the schools."'" Lottery
officials continue to make similar
remarks despite growing evidence prov-
ing the contrary-that lotteries are a
form of gambling, potentially as addic-
tive and destructive as alcoholism or
drug abuse.'9 These critics contend that
Lottery participation is gambling, and
that the refusal by Lottery officials to
recognize it as such is irresponsible.
2
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Another issue raised by lottery adver-
tising is whether it is worth its enormous
cost-that is, whether it is as effective as
Lottery officials and advertising execu-
tives would like the public to think. Even
CSL officials admit that its ubiquitous
advertising does not encourage people to
play the Lottery as effectively as other
stimuli, such as large jackpots and the
word-of-mouth and media attention that
accompany those jackpots.2'
Additionally, studies show that the
majority of Lottery tickets are generally
bought by the same group of people.
One study revealed that a core group of
18% of Lottery players bought 71% of
the Scratcher tickes sold during the first
45 days of the Lottery.2 Another survey
estimated that 20% of all lottery players
account for more than 65% of all money
wagered.3 This fact tends to show that
the general public is not significantly
swayed by the Lottery's advertising
campaigns. As a result, one wonders if
there would be any recognizable change
in Lottery participation if the state dis-
continued or restricted its promotion.
Assuming arguendo that some level
of Lottery promotion is acceptable, is the
current $67 million annual advertising
budget4 of the CSL justifiable? At that
amount, it constitutes one of the largest
west coast advertising accounts outside
the automobile industry.23 The nation's
second largest lottery, the New York
State Lottery, spends about $19 million
annually on advertising.6 Recently, the
Northern California Broadcasters Asso-
ciation announced that CSL is the top
radio advertiser in the San Francisco
market, based on radio advertising dollar
expenditures.7 According to a survey by
Gaming & Wagering Business magazine,
California's annual lottery advertising
budget as a percentage of ticket sales is
by far the highest among the seven
biggest lottery states.2" Further, although
the Lottery has now existed for over five
years, its advertising and public relations
program has expanded nearly 170%
since the Lottery's debut.
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What types of expenditures are in-
cluded in this enormous advertising/pub-
lic relations budget? The Lottery cur-
rently has a four-year advertising
contract with Dailey & Associates worth
up to $175 million. Further, the Lottery
has agreed to pay another public rela-
tions firm a maximum of $7.5 million
over four years to work with its own
twelve-member public affairs unit,
which itself has a $3 million annual bud-
get; and CSL has agreed to pay $57,300
to a Sacramento lobbying firm to help
the Lottery improve its image with edu-
cators.3"
For all its self-promotion, only about
3-4% of the state's education budget
comes from Lottery revenues.3 Further,
the Lottery Act contains no anti-sup-
planting language. Prior to the 1988
enactment of Proposition 98, this omis-
sion enabled the legislature to simply
divert from the education budget an
amount equal to the Lottery contribu-
tion-thus reducing the oft-advertised
"supplemental" impact of the Lottery on
education monies to zero. Other states
report that the overall economic effect of
their lotteries is also significantly less
than anticipated. Lotteries in New
Hampshire and New York have created
little revenue for their states.32 Overall,
states usually raise no more than 2-3% of
their revenues from their lotteries.
33
Is the result worth it? The answer to
that question depends on whom you ask.
However, one thing seems certain. If the
State of California chooses to actively
promote its Lottery, it must do so honest-
ly and in good faith. It must abide by all
applicable laws with respect to advertis-
ing form and content. And because the
State is acting, an extra burden must be
met. The State must continue to meet its
most vital function of protecting its citi-
zens. Has the State of California suc-
ceeded in meeting all of these criteria
while actively encouraging its citizens to





Prize Amounts. In the California Lot-
tery, prizes of $1 million or more are
paid in twenty equal annual
installments.4 Using the amount of $1
million as an example, this means that a
winner receives $50,000 in cash initially,
and each subsequent year will receive a
check in the amount of $50,000. Will the
number of dollars received total
1,000,000? Yes, before taxes and any
other deductions are made. Does this
mean that the winner has received a
prize worth $1 million, as advertised?
Absolutely not. The Lottery does not pay
out grand prizes in today's dollars, yet
that is how it describes the prize
amounts. In other words, CSL fails to
describe the amounts of the grand prizes
using the discounted present value. As
CSL knows, it costs only about $450,000
in today's money to buy an annuity that
will supply the $950,000 worth of
checks needed over the nineteen-year
period following the initial cash pay-
ment." And, as CSL knows, $1 million
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spread out over a twenty-year period is
worth significantly less than a $1 million
cash payment. As a result, prizes adver-
tised by the Lottery as being worth $1
million are actually worth approximately
half that much, even before taxes enter
the picture.
So what's the difference between $1
million now and "$1 million" over twen-
ty years? There's a big difference. A pru-
dent investment of $1 million now will
yield $100,000 per year ad infinitum;
whereas the Lottery's payment plan
yields only $50,000 per year, and the
income-generating principal is gone by
the end of the twentieth year.
Is CSL deceiving the public when it
advertises its "$1-million-plus" prizes as
it does? Lottery spokeswoman Joanne
McNabb attempted to defend the state's
policy by declaring that "[a]nyone who
wins a million dollars gets a million dol-
lars. The question is, is someone who
won a million dollars over twenty years
a millionaire? I'd say he's a million-dol-
lar winner."36
CSL also points to its "disclaimer"
which sometimes-but not
always-accompanies its advertising.
This disclaimer simply states: "Prizes of
$1 million or more paid over 20 years."
CSL apparently believes that the typical
Lottery player translates this piece of
information into the fact that CSL
invests about $450,000 in cash, depend-
ing on the bond market, in bonds
payable over twenty years, and that the
interest accrued plus the principal over
the specified term makes the annual pay-
ments to the winner and equals the sum
of the prize won. 7
The advertising claims of the Lottery
in this respect are obviously misleading,
and the current occasional disclaimer
does nothing to alleviate the problem.
Could this information be clearly and
concisely stated on documents dissemi-
nated to the public? It is interesting to
note that CSL executes a document enti-
tled ".Prize Structure" for each of its
"Scratcher" games; this is basically an
internal CSL document, available to the
public only through a California Public
Records Act request. On many of these
documents appears the following state-
ment: "A $1,000,000 prize ($50,000 for
20 years) costs about $500,000 (50% of
$1,000,000).""3 Californians have yet to
see this succinct, informative sentence
used in any Lottery brochure, commer-
cial, or billboard routinely thrust upon
the public. The Lottery should either pay
its winners what it advertises when it
advertises (that is, pay a million-dollar
winner $1 million immediately), or clari-










PRIZE ODDS WINNERS WINNERS IN WINNERS IN
1:IN IN 500 240,000 120,000,000
$1 18 28 13,440 6,720,000
$2 16 32 15,360 7,680,000
$5 42 12 5,760 2,880,000
$10 250 2 960 480,000
$50 4,000 0 60 30,000
$100 12,000 0 20 10,000
$500 60,000 0 4 2,000
$1,000 120,000 0 2 1,000
$5,000 800,000 0 0.3 150
$10,000 1,200,000 0 0.2 100
6.74 74 35,607 17,803,250
Odds of Winning. Table A contains a
portion of the information contained in
CSL's "Prize Structure" document relat-
ing to Instant Game Number 21 (a
Scratcher game). The information con-
tained in this document is typical of sim-
ilar information relating to other
Scratcher games. The document sets
forth the odds of winning each prize
amount, ranging from l-in-16 odds of
winning a $2 prize to l-in-l,200,000
odds of winning a $10,000 prize.
Although the best-stated odds of win-
ning a particular prize are 1-in-16 of
winning a $2 prize, CSL described the
"overall estimated odds" of winning a
prize as being I in 6.74, and printed only
this information on each ticket in this
particular Scratcher game.39 How does
CSL arrive at this figure? This figure
represents the odds of winning some
prize, but not a specific prize amount. In
other words, out of 120,000,000 total
tickets, 17,803,250 will be winners (1 in
6.74). The use of this singular piece of
information standing alone implies that
the odds of winning $10,000 are no dif-
ferent from the odds of winning $2, and
that the odds of winning even a $2 prize
are much better than they actually are.
For CSL's Instant Game No. 20,
"Lucky Streak" (another typical Lottery
game), the printed brochure issued to
retailers by CSL simply stated that
"[o]verall odds of winning are better
than I in 6.3." There was no reference to
the actual odds of winning each prize
amount. In order to discern that informa-
tion, a Lottery player must be fairly
knowledgeable in math and have a
calculator handy. One can only wonder
how many Lottery players were aware
that the odds of winning even the small-
est prize offered in the game were 1-in-
11 .9-worse than the "overall odds"
printed on the Lottery material-and that
the odds of winning the largest prize
offered in the game were 1-in-800,000.
Surprisingly, CSL's policy of disclos-
ing only "overall estimated odds" of
winning on tickets is authorized by
statute." This same statute also requires
CSL to make available to the public a
list of either "the estimated number of
prizes of each particular prize denomina-
tion that are expected to be awarded in
each Lottery Game", or "the estimated
odds of winning the prizes."'" Not sur-
prisingly, the Lottery refrains from pub-
lishing the odds of winning the prizes
and chooses instead to publish the more
positive number of prizes to be
awarded.2
"Instant" Winners? In "Lucky Jok-
er", a typical Scratcher game offered by
CSL, players could win $2, $5, $50,
$500, $5,000, or $100,000. However, a
player could instantly redeem only $2
and $5 winning tickets at the Lottery
retailer. To claim any of the four larger
prizes, a winner had to obtain a "Winner
Claim Form" from a Lottery retailer or
Lottery office, and mail or hand-deliver
a completed Claim Form and winning
ticket to any Lottery office, keeping a
carbon copy of the Claim Form as proof
of the claim. The prize payment would
then be mailed to the winner following
validation of the ticket. Despite the
potentially lengthy process involved, the
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Lottery's promotional material for this
game touts "instant prizes up to
$100,000.,41
Is this an "instant" prize? One group
in direct competition with the Lottery
did not think so. In 1986, Santa Anita
Race Track threatened court action to
force CSL to engage in "full, prominent
disclosure of...pertinent details."' One
of Santa Anita's complaints was that
CSL's use of the word "instant" implied
immediate payment of all possible
prizes, and was therefore misleading.45
Unfortunately, Santa Anita failed to pur-
sue its challenge to CSL's questionable
advertising technique.
More Chances To Win? In calculat-
ing the odds of winning a prize in its
Scratcher games, CSL determines that
one ticket equals one chance. Pursuant
to the game structure, a Lottery player
may win only one prize per ticket, if at
all. However, despite that fact, no less
than three CSL Scratcher games have
been advertised as providing Lottery
players with "three chances to win" per
Scratcher ticket. In June 1988, CSL
advertised its "Triple Header" Scratcher
game with the following statement:
"Each ticket starts with not one, but
three chances for you to win."" The
game consisted of three separate lines
containing baseball box scores. If the
number in the "Your Score" column was
higher than the number in the "Their
Score" column, the player won the prize
printed on that line. If the Lottery play-
er's score exceeded the other score pro-
vided for all three games, the player did
not win three separate prizes: he/she
won one independent prize (the opportu-
nity to go to the "Big Spin").
In order for CSL's claim to be true, a
"Triple Header" player would have to be
capable of winning a separate prize on
each of the three lines containing box
scores. However, this was not the case:
no ticket contained only two winning
box scores, and tickets with three win-
ning box scores won one distinct prize.
Therefore, each ticket provided only one
chance at winning a prize.
Further, in May 1990, CSL published
a press release announcing the expan-
sion of its Lotto field size from 49 to 53
numbers. The expansion of the field
decreased the chance of winning the
Lotto jackpot from 1-in- 14,000,000 to I -
in-23,000,000. But how did CSL explain
the effect of this change on a Lotto play-
er's odds of winning a prize? "The
expansion of the Lotto number field size
from 49 to 53 will increase the number
of possible winning Lotto number com-
binations...."'" This statement, of course,
implies that it will be easier to win with
the expanded field size.
Marketing Strategies. The California
State Lottery devotes substantial
resources toward encouraging members
of specific ethnic groups to play various
Lottery games.9 Specifically, CSL has
developed consumer marketing plans
targeted at Hispanics, African-Ameri-
cans, and Asians. Each marketing plan
appears to focus on perceived stereotypi-
cal characteristics of each group. For
example, CSL's Hispanic consumer mar-
keting plan includes the following tac-
tics:
-"Emphasize the proceeds to educa-
tion campaign to Hispanics because of
the high regard and respect for education
and teachers that is profoundly felt by
the Hispanic community... .Consider
using a well known personality as
spokesperson."0
-"Use [a] newly contracted Spanish-
speaking spokesperson extensively since
the Hispanic consumer more easily
establishes a loyalty and a trust relation-
ship with a familiar figure."'
The Lottery's Asian marketing plan is
aimed at the Filipino, Chinese, Japanese,
Korean, and Vietnamese cultures. As of
September 1988, CSL had "not conduct-
ed any comprehensive Asian research
primarily due to the relatively small size
of the individual groups compared to the
Hispanic and general groups."5' Howev-
er, the Lottery proposed to "generate
accurate data in order to successfully tap
the full sales potential of the Asian mar-
ket." 3 Specific marketing tactics of CSL
regarding its "Asian Consumer Market"
are as follows:
-"A grassroots retail marketing pro-
gram should be adopted. This approach
would start with the use of ethnic-specif-
ic in-store, on-premise promotional/mer-
chandising efforts such as posters, table
tents, signages, point-of-sale displays,
premiums, and free ticket giveaways.
This effort should work its way to the
streets where the out-of-home media,
such as billboards, bus shelters and bus
benches, could have a profound sublimi-
nal effect on the Lottery's objective of
image building."
-"Education is an important issue
among Asian Pacifics, so the Lottery is
missing a major opportunity by not more
effectively communicating the education
proceeds message to this segment."5
One Lottery advertising company
assigned the task of developing Asian-
targeted advertisements stated that as a
group, Asians tend to value control over
luck, and therefore recommended to
heavily feature the few games that
appear to involve some element of con-
trol5 6
Regarding its African-American con-
sumer marketing strategy, the Lottery
notes the following:
-"[T]he Lottery must continue to be
careful not to overlook the unique cultur-
al needs of Black consumers in favor of
the more obvious language interpretation
needs of other ethnic groups."57
"The Lottery ethnic creative results
should be evaluated on an ongoing basis
to ensure that they are effective, believ-
able, and motivating."5 (No similar
directive was included to ensure that
they are true and accurate.)
One commentator noted that when
advertising to African-Americans, Lot-
tery advertisements appeal to aspirations
for upward mobility with slogans such as
"Think Big." 9
So what's wrong with CSL research-
ing its customers and adapting different
advertising campaigns for different sec-
tors of society? The same things that
were wrong with a similar marketing
campaign proposed by the R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company (RJR) in early 1990.
Soon after RJR announced its plans to
market "Uptown"-a cigarette aimed
explicitly towards African-Ameri-
cans-sharp criticism by civil rights
groups and Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, Secre-
tary of the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, caused RJR to
withdraw its plans.° Sullivan described
the marketing strategy as "slick and sin-
ister."' 6' Four weeks later, the Washing-
ton Post reported that RJR planned to
market a cigarette brand named "Dako-
ta" aimed at eighteen- to twenty-year-old
white women with only a high school
education or less, working in an "entry
level service or factory job.
62
Why might RJR be eager to attract
these groups? Because, like CSL, RJR
appears to know which groups of people
might be attracted to its product. Despite
growing numbers of non-smokers, those
who continue to smoke tend to be less
educated, women, or African-Ameri-
cans." Similarly, according to the Latino
Issues Forum, a study conducted by CSL
itself showed that the typical Hispanic
Lottery player purchases 2.5 times as
many Lotto tickets as the typical white
Lottery player, even though Latino per-
capita income is about half the white
per-capita income statewide.' Moreover,
a study by the San Jose Mercury News
demonstrates that Californians earning
between $7,000 and $18,000 per year
spend more than twice as much per per-
son on the Lottery as do those earning
between $34,000 and $75,000.5 Aiming
a "get-rich-quick" gambling scheme
at those least able to afford the inevit-
able loss is pernicious. Marketing a
harmful product toward anyone is
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improper; targeting a vulnerable group
with an addictive product they may not
be able to afford is intolerable. While
this type of behavior is not unexpected
from a private enterprise, such conduct
by government is unconscionable.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Before certain advertising and/or
marketing techniques of CSL could be
challenged in court, a review of the
applicable law is necessary.
Federal Provisions. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) Act broadly
prohibits unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce.' In order io prove a violation of
this provision, one need only show that
the challenged practice has a tendency or
capacity to deceive the consumer. The
likelihood of deception or the capacity to
deceive is the criterion by which the
advertising is judged.67 An advertisement
soliciting the purchase of goods is an
"unfair method of competition" for pur-
poses of 15 U.S.C. section 45(a)(1)
where the advertisement contains false
representations.8 Further, the mere fact
that words and sentences may be literal-
ly and technically true does not prevent
their being framed in such a way as to
mislead or deceive so as to constitute a
violation of the FTC statute.9
The FTC's review of deceptive
advertising by a seller to the public
involves five elements. First, it is imma-
terial whether the seller has an intent to
deceive or knowledge of the falsity of
the representation made to the public."
Second, it is not necessary to show that
any consumers were actually deceived."
Third, the FTC traditionally judges the
tendency to deceive from the viewpoint
of the gullible consumer.72 Fourth, the
deception must relate to a material fact,
one that could affect a consumer's pur-
chase decision.73 Finally, the FTC inter-
prets the meaning of an advertisement
by judging the overall or net impression.
Thus, the FTC will look at the context in
which the representation is made, corre-
sponding pictures, and disclaimers,
among other things. The FTC will also
look for half-truths or innuendo, decep-
tion by omission, and double meanings
of words or phrases used.74
Although the FTC's authority to
interfere with the actions of a state act-
ing in its sovereign capacity has recently
been called into question,75 the FTC can
and does proceed against state agencies
and entities engaged in deceptive adver-
tising in their proprietary capacities."
In addition to the FTC Act's proscrip-
tions against deceptive advertising,
another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. section
1301, places specific restrictions on the
lottery industry. However, 18 U.S.C.
section 1307 specifically exempts state-
run lotteries from these provisions.
State Provisions. In California, Busi-
ness and Professions Code section 17500
provides:
[i]t is unlawful for any person,
firm, corporation or association,
or any employee thereof with
intent directly or indirectly to dis-
pose of real or personal proper-
ty...to make or disseminate or
cause to be made or disseminated
before the public in this state...in
any newspaper or other publica-
tion, or any advertising devise, or
by public outcry or proclamation,
or in any other manner or means
whatever, any statements con-
cerning such real or personal
property.. .which is untrue or mis-
leading, and which is known, or
which by the exercise of reason-
able care should be known, to be
untrue or misleading....
Any act which constitutes a violation of
section 17500 also satisfies the defini-
tion of "unfair competition" in section
17200. Section 17200 provides that
"unfair competition shall mean and
include unlawful, unfair or fraudulent
business practice and unfair, deceptive,
untrue or misleading advertising and any
act prohibited by Chapter I (commenc-
ing with 17500) of the Business and Pro-
fessions Code."
Unlike the federal statute restricting
lotteries, the Business and Professions
Code's deceptive advertising provisions
are expressly applicable to California
State Lottery advertising. In 1986, AB
2008 (Bronzan) was enacted into law;
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AB 2008 amended Government Code
section 8880.24 to specifically require
the California Lottery Commission, "[i]n
decisions relating to advertising and pro-
motion of the Lottery [to] ensure that the
Lottery complies with both the letter and
spirit of laws governing false and mis-
leading advertising, including Section
17500 et seq. of the Business and Profes-
sions Code." Further, AB 2008 amended
Government Code section 8880.35 to
impose the same duty on CSL's Director.
Therefore, CSL is specifically prohibited
from engaging in any type of unfair
competition or misleading advertising.
Case law interpreting section 17500
emphasizes the fact that a statement need
not be untrue in order to be prohibited.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has
held that "[i]rrespective of its truth or
falsity, any statement which is deceptive
or merely misleading- without intent to
deceive, violates [the section]." 8 It is not
necessary that a statement actually lead
to deception or confusion to be action-
able under section 17500. "What consti-
tutes 'unfair competition"...under any
given set of circumstances is a question
of fact, the essential test being whether
the public is likely to be deceived."'7
Actual damage resulting from mislead-
ing advertising is not necessary to con-
stitute a violation of section 17500.80
Also, courts have held that a defen-
dant need not have actual knowledge of
the untrue or misleading nature of the
statements made if, by the exercise of
reasonable care, the defendant should
have known that the statements were
untrue or misleading." Further, if a per-
son "makes such an absolute, unquali-
fied and positive statement on his part,
when in fact he has no knowledge
whether his assertion is true or false, and
his statement proves to be false, he is as
culpable as if he had willfully asserted





Courts have found advertising to be
misleading when words having a double
meaning are used by an advertiser. "One
who does this cannot escape the charge
of misleading or deceiving by saying
that to him, or as he meant the words,
they were true."3
With regard to CSL's advertising of
the value of its prizes, Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 17501 specifically
requires the "value of any thing adver-
tised [to be] the prevailing market
price...at the time of publication of such
advertisement...." The phrase "prevail-
ing market price" contained in section
17501 means the predominating price
that may be obtained for merchandise
similar to the article in question on the
open market and within the community
where the article is sold.4 The "prevail-
ing market price" is determined wholly
and exclusively by the conditions of the
market at the time and place of sale."
Further, the purpose of section 17501,
when considered in conjunction with
section 17500, is to ensure the truth and
candor of advertisements which describe
or characterize merchandise as possess-
ing a certain worth or value."
Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 17539.1 places certain restrictions
on any person engaged in the operation
of any contest. CSL is arguably subject
to these provisions, as it is not one of the
entities specifically excluded from its
coverage by Business and Professions
Code section 17539.3. Section 17539.1
prohibits operators of contests from
activity such as misrepresenting in any
manner the odds of winning any prize;
failing to clearly and conspicuously dis-
close with all promotional material all
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rules, regulations, terms, and conditions
of the contest; failing to clearly and con-
spicuously disclose the exact nature and
approximate value of the prizes when
offered; and using the word "lucky"
under specified circumstances.7
Turning to remedies for violations of
these laws, section 17534 of the Busi-
ness and Professions Code provides that
any person, firm, corporation, or associ-
ation, or any employee or agent thereof,
who violates the misleading advertising
laws, including the above-referenced
statutes, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Section 17535 provides that untrue or
misleading advertising may be enjoined
and restitution ordered to a party injured
by prohibited acts. Actions for injunc-
tion may be prosecuted by the Attorney
General, any district attorney, county
counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor
in the name of the people of the State of
California upon their own complaint, or
upon the complaint of any board, officer,
corporation, association, or by any mem-
ber of the general public."
LEGAL APPRAISAL
Based on the foregoing description of
CSL advertising techniques, and in light
of the applicable provisions of law, sev-
eral of CSL's activities appear to consti-
tute false or misleading advertising. For
example, if California law requires that
the value of any thing advertised be the
prevailing market price, and the prevail-
ing market price of an annuity which
provides $50,000 a year for nineteen
years is $450,000, it is doubtful that a
court of law would allow CSL to contin-
ue advertising the value of such a prize
as being $1,000,000 without a clear and
express disclaimer provided prior to pur-
chase. The brunt of CSL's advertise-
ments do not include any disclaimer and
mislead about the actual value of the
prize. Moreover, a subsequent clarifica-
tion or disclaimer cannot cure the prior
deceit; a misleading statement used to
"bait" a consumer violates deceptive
advertising statutes applying to private
parties even if corrected prior to pur-
chase.89
Further, the public is likely to be
deceived by CSL's claim that a single
Scratcher ticket has "three chances to
win," when each Scratcher ticket consti-
tutes one and only one chance to win a
prize. Also, CSL's use of the "overall
estimated odds," combined with its
deliberate decision not to publicize the
actual odds of winning each prize
amount, arguably constitute a practice
which is likely to deceive the public into
believing that the odds of winning cer-
tain prize amounts are better than they
actually are. Finally, CSL's use of the
word "instant" in reference to Scratcher
prize amounts is likely to mislead a Lot-
tery player into believing that any prize
won could be redeemed instantly.
Although some of CSL's marketing
techniques discussed here-such as its
minority-targeting strategies-might not
violate express provisions of law, they
do breach the State of California's social
and ethical responsibilities to its citizens
and demonstrates the conflict of interest
in which the State has placed itself by
promoting gambling. Further, even
assuming arguendo that CSL's advertis-
ing does not violate the letter of Califor-
nia's laws prohibiting false and mislead-
ing advertising, many of CSL's
advertising techniques clearly violate the
spirit of those laws. And, as noted
above, the CSL Director and Commis-
sion are statutorily obligated to ensure
that Lottery advertising and promotion
comply with both the letter and the spirit
of those laws.'
LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS
On October 3, 1990-the fifth birth-
day of the California Lottery, the Senate
Committee on Governmental Organiza-
tion held a hearing regarding CSL. Dur-
ing that hearing, members of the Comit-
tee expressed considerable misgivings
regarding CSL's advertising and promo-
tional revenue expenditures. The Center
for Public Interest Law (CPIL) testified
at that hearing regarding its concerns
over both the amount and content of
CSL's advertising, and provided possible
legislative options for correcting some of
the present problems. Specifically, CPIL
made the following recommendations,
which are presently under consideration
by members of the Committee:
Repeal CSL's Exemption from the
APA. Currently, the California State Lot-
tery Commission is exempt from the
rulemaking provisions of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA);" this
means that the Commission is free to
promulgate rules and regulations without
notice, hearing, or opportunity for public
comment. As a result, the Office of
Administrative Law has no jurisdiction
to review CSL's rules or to ensure that
CSL's rules comply with the clarity, con-
sistency, necessity, authority, reference,
and nonduplication requirements of the
APA.92 No governmental entity reviews
these rules prior to their implementation.
Other entities which administer con-
stantly-changing programs promoted to
the general public-including the Cali-
fornia Horse Racing Board-are fully
subject to the APA, and there is no rea-
son to distinguish the Lottery. CPIL rec-
ommends that the legislature remove the
Commission's exemption from the APA,
thus ensuring public notice, comment
and debate regarding CSL's proposed
rules and regulations.
AG Should Review All CSL Materi-
als Intended for the Public. As noted
above, the California State Lottery Com-
mission is statutorily required to ensure
that CSL complies with both the letter
and spirit of laws governing false and
misleading advertising, including sec-
tion 17500 of the Business and Profes-
sions Code.93 In June 1989, CPIL made a
Public Records Act request to CSL,
requesting copies of the minutes from
any and all Commission meetings since
January 1987 at which advertising form
and/or content were discussed. In
response to this request, CPIL received
minutes from only five of the Commis-
sion's 48 monthly meetings since 1987;
none of the minutes received indicate
that the Commission takes an active role
in ensuring that CSL's advertising form
or content complies with all applicable
laws. As a result, CPIL recommends that
a separate state office, such as the Office
of the Attorney General, review all Lot-
tery advertising-prior to its release-to
ensure compliance with both the letter
and spirit of the laws governing false and
misleading advertising 4 CPIL also rec-
ommends that the Attorney General's
office review the prize-claiming in-
formation printed on all Lottery tick-
ets-which has proven to be extremely
confusing to many Lottery players.95
Restructure Composition of CSL.
When the California voters approved
Proposition 37, it was with the under-
standing and directive that CSL's Direc-
tor and the Commission would, in all
decisions, "take into account the particu-
larly sensitive nature of the California
State Lottery and.. .act to promote and
ensure integrity, security, honesty, and
fairness in the operation and administra-
tion of the Lottery."96 In many
instances-such as in endorsing adver-
tising campaigns which seem to exploit
California's low-income and minority
populations-both the Director and the
Commission have abdicated this respon-
sibility. In order to ensure that the Com-
mission acts in a more socially responsi-
ble manner, CPIL recommends that the
California Lottery Act be amended to
require that at least one Commissioner
has experience in consumer representa-
tion or public interest law, and to require
that at least one Commissioner has at
least five years' experience dealing with
the treatment of gambling or other addic-
tive behavior.
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Other Suggestions. In addition to
these recommendations, CPIL also
offers the following legislative options:
-As noted above, the California Lot-
tery Act currently requires CSL to print
the "overall estimated odds of winning
some prize or some cash prize" on each
Scratcher ticket, and to make available at
each Lottery retail location either a
"detailed tabulation of the estimated
number of prizes of each particular prize
denomination that are expected to be
awarded in each Lottery Game, or the
estimated odds of winning the pri-
zes.... "I This provision should be am-
ended to require that the odds of winning
each prize amount be made available to
the public at each location where tickets
are sold, and that CSL note on each
Scratcher ticket hat the "overall odds of
winning some prize or some cash prize"
does not reflect the odds of winning any
particular prize amount.
-Currently, the California Lottery Act
states that "no more than 16% of the
total annual revenues shall be allocated
for payment of expenses of the Lot-
tery.... '.. Because CSL's annual Lottery
advertising budget (as a percentage of
ticket sales) is by far the highest among
the seven biggest lottery states,99 and
because CSL's advertising and public
relations program has climbed nearly
170% since the Lottery's debut,"° CPIL
recommends that this provision be
amended to require that no more than
10% of the total annual revenues may be
allocated for Lottery expenses, and that
the share set aside as allocations to vari-
ous educational programs be increased
by the 6% removed from the administra-
tive budget.
-Pursuant to the California Lottery
Act, CSL's Director is authorized to
"engage an independent firm experi-
enced in the analysis of advertising, pro-
motion, public relations, incentives, and
other aspects of communications to con-
duct a special study of the effectiveness
of such communication activities and
make recommendations to the Commis-
sion.... "'°' Although this may be a worth-
while use of Lottery funds, many firms
may hesitate to be too critical of CSL out
of fear of losing future Lottery contracts.
As a result, CPIL recommends that the
Office of Auditor General be required to
make an annual, independent report
regarding the efficiency and/or effective-
ness of all Lottery operations, including
but not limited to Lottery advertising.
This report would be presented to the
Governor, the Legislature, the Con-
troller, the Treasurer, the Attorney Gen-
eral, and the Commission not more than
ninety days after the close of each fiscal
year.
CONCLUSION
Lotteries have become a popular way
to raise money. Research indicates that
lotteries work because they appeal to
two elements common to mass chi-
canery: the prospect of dream-like
enrichment, and the inability of the
human mind to calculate rationally the
real odds of success. This latter failure
derives from a basic inability of the
human mind to countenance the real sig-
nificance of a scale of millions or bil-
lions. And lottery advertising seeks to
influence those groups most amenable to
influence: those for whom the dream is
alluring because they lack even necessi-
ties, and those whose abstract powers of
reasoning and calculation are not well
advanced. Let's be more blunt: Lottery
advertising is aimed at people who are
poor or naive, and it works-partly
because it fails to impart sufficient factu-
al information to enable the player to
make an informed choice.
Lotteries certainly work in obtaining
monies from persons in the lower
income brackets. Studies by the Califor-
nia State Lottery of who plays avoid,
with deliberate care, inquiry into the
regressive effects of the Lottery's collec-
tions. The data they gather indicates that
persons in all income groupings have
bought a ticket with equal incidence. But
they avoid calculation of amount gam-
bled and of percentage of income gam-
bled. Here, we do not need to survey the
volume of Lottery sales at liquor stores
in Logan Heights, Watts, or Hunters
Point. We know who is paying big. The
poor are. Those who have hungry kids at
home.
Some would say, "So what?" Those
are the same people who think that Ed
McMahon will be opening up their
sweepstakes ticket, or that the 1/4-carat
diamond on the land solicitation gift list
they may have won is equivalent to the
Cadillac and Hawaiian vacation which
they may have also won with equal odds.
Or they believe that they too may get
rich immediately on real estate with no
down and all financing from government
programs nobody else knows about.
Why be paternalistic? If they want to
waste their money, let them. Besides, a
little gambling is the spice of life. Isn't
the ball game a little more fun if we have
$10 riding on it?
Gambling is not intrinsically evil,
particularly if one follows the admonish-
ment of Aristotle and maintains "moder-
ation, moderation in all things." But the
critics have a point. Isn't the State sup-
posed to stand for something? Sure, it
needs money too. But should it exploit
human weaknesses and actively take
large sums of money from people with-
out at least clearly informing them of
their real odds of a return? The State
enforces a law prohibiting gambling.
Then it turns around and finances itself
by promoting gambling-and promoting
it hard among those who are the most
vulnerable to its abuse, and brooking no
limits on the amount which can be bet.
Worse yet, it sells the whole scheme
by wrapping itself in the flag of educa-
tion. Except the Lottery initiative was
written so sloppily that the money it
raised simply replaced money already in
the education budget, which was moved
out and into the general fund (before
Proposition 98 was enacted). So the
politicians stole the money from the fund
they used to sell the Lottery. It is clear
that the only real beneficiaries of the
California Lottery are the liquor stores,
advertising executives, mass media, lot-
tery contractors, and the bureaucrats
administering and selling the Lottery.
And the critics have another philo-
sophical problem. The State is supposed
to represent our consensus values. It
should work toward our highest aspira-
tions. And one of our cultural premises
has been that people reap what they sow.
Hard work and performance will win
out. If one offers goods and services in
the marketplace which benefit others,
he/she will be rewarded. Instead, the
Lottery promotes a very different ethic:
"dream a little dream with me," the ads
purr, more reminiscent of the values of
the drug culture than of the culture of
Horatio Alger. Take a chance, life is just
a big spin, whether you win or lose
depends not upon what you do, but blind
luck.
That such a message should be toler-
ated is debatable; after all, this is a free
country. But should it be the message of
the State? Should it be the means for it to
feed itself? That is also debatable. In
California, those opposing State entre
into gambling while prohibiting it for
others have lost. And they lost in the
proper crucible for such an issue-by a
vote of the people. But the doubts
expressed by the critics have a last safe
harbor: the way in which the Lottery
conducts its gambling venture, as the
State, must be beyond reproach and must
minimize the harm to those most vulner-
able to its abuses. The Lottery must not
become the twentieth-century miracle
elixir barkers, not when that very same
State is prosecuting vigorously any pri-
vate gambling and any advertiser in the
private sector for misleading advertising
under strict scrutiny.
The concerns of Lottery critics sur-
vive their defeat on its allowance,
and are embodied in legislation to,
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theoretically, preclude deception or mis-
leading advertising, to require meaning-
ful contribution to educational revenue
needs of the state, and to gather data on
the impact of this State system of gam-
bling on the poor and those with a psy-
chological addiction to gambling. But,
all of these provisions are administered
by a Lottery Commission given the con-
comitant legal obligation to raise maxi-
mum funds for state consumption; a pre-
occupation which regrettably has
dominated legislative review of the Lot-
tery. Our examination of the record
reveals that the original critics of the lot-
tery system have been proven correct,
and that the legal protections successful-
ly emplaced in law to assuage that criti-
cism have failed. The Lottery has forgot-
ten about ameliorating abuse; it is
knee-deep in the self-promotion of a
gambling system above all and at all
costs. It has become the largest paid
advertiser in the state, and the media has
rolled over to push its sleazy message at
seemingly every news break. And this
from the State-the enforcer of decep-
tive advertising and unfair competition
and gambling prohibition laws. The
State of California has failed to set an
example of propriety, taste, integrity, or
public interest concern. It has become
king of the hucksters.
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